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An entanglement witness approach to quantum coherent state key distribution and a system for
its practical implementation are described. In this approach, eavesdropping can be detected by a
change in sign of either of two witness functions, an entanglement witness S or an eavesdropping
witness W. The effects of loss and eavesdropping on system operation are evaluated as a function
of distance. Although the eavesdropping witness W does not directly witness entanglement for
the system, its behavior remains related to that of the true entanglement witness S . Furthermore,
W is easier to implement experimentally than S . W crosses the axis at a finite distance, in a
manner reminiscent of entanglement sudden death. The distance at which this occurs changes
measurably when an eavesdropper is present. The distance dependance of the two witnesses due to
amplitude reduction and due to increased variance resulting from both ordinary propagation losses
and possible eavesdropping activity is provided. Finally, the information content and secure key
rate of a continuous variable protocol using this witness approach are given.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.65Ud, 03.67.Hk, 42.50.Ex
I. INTRODUCTION
The goal of quantum key distribution (QKD) is for
two participants (Alice and Bob) to generate a shared
cryptographic key of bits in such a way that quantum
mechanics prevents an eavesdropper (Eve) from obtain-
ing significant information about the key without being
detected. QKD schemes [1, 2] based on the transmis-
sion of single photons or entangled photon pairs tend
to be highly secure [3]. However, because single pho-
tons can be easily absorbed or deflected, the operational
distances and key generation rates of these schemes are
limited. It is often desirable to instead use pairs of en-
tangled coherent states, because individual-photon-level
losses have little effect on them. Along with this benefit
comes the challenge of revealing the action of eavesdrop-
pers: it suffices for Eve to obtain only a small fraction
of the coherent state beam to measure the transmitted
state. Moreover, although pairs of entangled coherent
states can be created [4, 5], randomly modulating them
as needed for QKD is a nontrivial task.
Recently [6], a technique applicable to detection of an
eavesdropper on a quantum optical communication chan-
nel was proposed which involved phase-entangling two
coherent state beams by interaction with a single photon
inside a nonlinear medium. In that scheme, a beam split-
ter first puts a photon into a superposition of two pos-
sible path states. A phase shift is induced conditionally,
depending on the path state, so that the pair of beams
becomes phase-entangled. Alice and Bob each receive
one beam and make homodyne measurements to deter-
mine its phase. The relative phase between the beams
determines the bit value to be used in the key. Effects
due to eavesdropping are made detectable by introducing
additional interferometers with controllable phase shifts
σ1 and σ2 just before each of the detectors, respectively.
Interference terms then appear in the joint detection rate
as σ1 and σ2 are varied. If the beams have not been dis-
turbed in transit, the visibility of this interference should
be greater than 1√
2
≈ 70.7%, suggesting stronger-than-
classical correlations and violation of a Bell-type inequal-
ity. If the visibility drops below 70.7%, this could indicate
that the beam has been tampered with. This method
in principle allows phase-entangled states to be robustly
distributed over large distances.
In this paper, we propose a new technique for reveal-
ing eavesdroppers in systems for quantum key bit dis-
tribution. This technique introduces entanglement in a
manner similar to [6], but uses a fundamentally different
approach to eavesdropper detection. Rather than using
Bell violation for checking security, the idea is to instead
look for degradation or death of entanglement due to
Eve’s actions by using functions designed to witness it
[7, 8]. The switch from measurements of non-local in-
terference associated with a Bell-type inequality direct
entanglement-related witnesses provides substantial ben-
efits: it both expands the effective operating distance and
simplifies the required apparatus. The increase in oper-
ating distance is due to the fact that Bell violation is a
stronger condition than entanglement. The particular en-
tanglement witness S [9] used is negative for all finite dis-
tances when the coherent states propagate undisturbed;
however, S changes sign to a positive value in the pres-
ence of eavesdropping, thus revealing Eve’s intervention.
Another related witness function W which is more easily
measured but does not directly indicate entanglement in
our system can also serve this purpose. To our knowl-
edge, this is the first time such an approach has been
2proposed for use in QKD.
As in [6], which involves the Bell inequality, the main
goal of these functions is simply to reveal the presence of
eavesdropping on the line; when the eavesdropper’s signa-
ture is observed, the communicating parties know to shut
down the line and seek another communication channel.
The actual bits either may be derived from the entangled
phases or they may arise from normal telecom approaches
of modulating the intense coherent states. In this sense,
the goal is to provide a “quantum tripwire” for practical
use, as opposed to absolute security in the sense that the
phrase is commonly used in QKD. In other words, the
basic idea is to take a more pragmatic approach to com-
munication by providing an extra quantum-based layer
of security to support highly efficient classical communi-
cation. As a result, our primary goal is less general and
less difficult to achieve than other continuous variable
protocols [10–16] that have been proposed with the goal
of unconditional security in mind. Nonetheless, as dis-
cussed in Sec. VII the witness approach is used directly
on the key-bit transmitting system to provide security to
fully quantum communication as well.
It is because the witness S itself involves third-order
correlation functions, which may be inconvenient to im-
plement experimentally, that we also consider the sec-
ond witness function W . W is related by rescaling of
the quadratures to a well-known entanglement witness
Ws [17, 18], but is not in the strict sense a true entan-
glement witness in the current context. Despite this, it
gives eavesdropper-detection results that match well with
those of S, and has the additional advantage that it is
built from the covariance matrix of the system, which
is easily accessible experimentally. W starts from an ini-
tially negative value, but then crosses the axis to positive
values at finite distance, both during free propagation
and in the presence of eavesdropping. This is closely anal-
ogous to the phenomenon of entanglement sudden death
(ESD) [19], in which entanglement is lost after propagat-
ing a finite distance. The crossing occurs at a distance
that can be easily predicted when there is no eavesdrop-
ping present. When eavesdropping occurs, the curve of
W versus distance shifts by a measurable amount; in par-
ticular, there is a clear alteration of the distance at which
the sign changes, allowing for easy detection.
We will collectively refer to quantities which are mea-
surably altered by predictable amounts in the presence
of eavesdropping as eavesdropping witnesses; both the
true entanglement witness S and the additional function
W are examples of such functions. It is shown that the
two give consistent results for the distance over which the
entanglement becomes unusable for eavesdropper detec-
tion.
Throughout this paper, coherent state quadratures will
be defined in terms of creation and annihilation operators
via the relations
qˆ =
1
2
(
aˆ+ aˆ†
)
, pˆ =
1
2i
(
aˆ− aˆ†) . (1)
It should be noted that there are several other normal-
ization conventions that are common in the literature,
with different constants in front on the right-hand side.
Accordingly, when results from other authors are quoted
in the following sections, the form used here may differ
from their originally published forms by factors of two in
some terms.
We begin in Section II by describing the entangled
states under consideration and their means of produc-
tion. The eavesdropping model assumed is described in
Sec. III. There, we model the eavesdropping procedure
by introducing a Gaussian cloner into the path of one of
the coherent states. We then introduce the entanglement
witness S and analyze its behavior in Section IV. In or-
der to have a more convenient experimental measure, we
then introduce W in V, and look in section VI at some
of its properties, with emphasis on its behavior under
eavesdropping. Discussion of some information-related
aspects in Sec. VII is then followed by a brief discussion
of the results in section VIII.
II. PHASE-ENTANGLED COHERENT STATES
The apparatus for the proposed system is shown in
Fig. 1 (a). A laser followed by a beam splitter produces
a pair of optical coherent states, each in state |α〉. As in
[6], the coherent state subsystem pair initially produced
in state |α〉A|α〉B becomes entangled in an interferometer
by coupling to a single photon. A beam splitter first
causes the photon state to enter a superposition of two
path eigenstates. Then if the photon is in the upper path
state, beam B gains a phase shift 2φ due to cross-phase
modulation of the photon with that beam in a nonlinear
Kerr medium [20–25], whereas if the photon is in the
lower path state, then there is a phase shift of 2φ in
beam A. Finally, by adding another constant phase shift
to each beam, we can then arrange the output to be in
the entangled state
|ψ〉 = N√
2
(|α+〉A|α−〉B + eiθ|α−〉A|α+〉B) , (2)
where
|N |−2 =
(
1 + cos θ e−4|α|
2 sin2 φ
)
(3)
and α± ≡ αe±iφ. (For simplicity, we do not explicitly in-
dicate the single-photon states.) In the following, opera-
tors with subscripts 1 and 2, respectively, will correspond
to Alice’s beam and to Bob’s.
Note that, whereas ±φ are the phase shifts of the co-
herent states within a given path state, θ is the relative
phase between the two joint path states of the photon.
The value of joint phase θ can be controlled by the ex-
perimenters: Keeping only events in which the photon
is detected at detector 1 leads to θ = pi, while events in
which it exits at detector 2 lead to θ = 0. (Other values
of θ can be achieved if desired by, for example, putting
a piece of glass in one of the potential single photon
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FIG. 1: (Color online) Schemes for phase-based coherent state
key distribution with single-photon triggers. (a) Scheme of
the current paper. A beam splitter splits a laser beam into
two beams in identical coherent states (solid black lines); a
phase shifter compensates for the phase gained in the reflected
state. A single photon also enters a superposition of two path
states (dashed red lines). Due to the joint interaction of co-
herent state and the photon within Kerr media, the beams
enter an equal-weight superposition of product states of pairs
of oppositely phase-shifted coherent states. The specific form
of the detection unit will be different for each of the applica-
tions to be discussed in the text. (b) Scheme of [6], with two
additional interferometers to test for Bell violations.
paths.) If the interferometer lacks stability, randomly-
varying phases in the single-photon paths could lead to
decoherence. But these photons could be kept on a sin-
gle bench in Alice’s lab and be well-controlled to pre-
vent this. Fluctuations in the phases of the coherent
states |α±〉A|α∓〉B → |α±eiδφ1(t)〉A|α∓eiδφ2(t)〉B would
be a more serious problem because these are shared be-
tween labs that may be widely separated. This random
phase variation is an independent source of entanglement
loss, separate from the entanglement loss due to ampli-
tude decay and eavesdropping. (We focus here on the
latter, leaving the former to be discussed elsewhere.)
Using homodyne detection, each participant can mea-
sure the phase of his or her beam to determine the sign of
its shift. Because the shifts in the two beams are always
opposite, this is sufficient for Alice and Bob to obtain
common key bits; for example, if Alice has +φ and Bob
has −φ, they can take the common bit value to be 0,
while the opposite case then corresponds to 1.
Unfortunately, an eavesdropper may extract part of the
beam and determine the bit transmitted. Although this
cannot be prevented, it can be detected, so that Alice and
Bob can prevent key material from being compromised
by shutting down the communication line. Recall that,
for the purpose of revealing Eve’s intervention, the pro-
posal of [6] is to include two additional interferometers
(Fig. 1 (b)), each coupling one beam to another photon
in order to detect nonlocal interference for Bell inequality
tests. That approach has at least two limitations: (i) On
the theoretical side, detecting Eve only requires entan-
glement, which in practice may still exist even when the
Bell inequality is not violated [26]; thus, the setup tests
for a less than ideal property. (ii) On the experimen-
tal side, simultaneous single-photon events are needed in
three independent interferometers. This low-probability
triple-coincidence in widely-separated interferometers is
a significant practical limitation. The method given in
the present paper avoids this problem by removing the
need for more than one interferometer.
Because the amplitude of the input beam can be easily
tuned, the system can be adjusted to work at different op-
erating distances, potentially (as we see in the following
sections) up to distances of several hundred kilometers.
Current technology can realistically reach amplitudes |α|
of up to 103− 104 without doing damage to the fibers or
producing high amounts of fluorescence and scattering;
but for illustrative purposes of future potential we have
included plots with values of up to 106 at some points in
the following.
III. THE EFFECT OF EAVESDROPPING
To examine measures against eavesdropping, we con-
sider the case in which Eve attaches a Gaussian cloner
[27] to one of the beams, which we assume to be Bob’s.
The cloner takes an input beam and makes two copies
that have the same mean amplitude as the input. Eve
keeps one beam and sends the other on to Bob. But in-
evitably, there is a net increase in the variance of Bob’s
beam that will indicate her presence. Moreover, the more
exact a copy Eve’s beam is (i.e. the lower its variance),
the larger the disturbance to Bob’s beam. Specifically,
if σBj and σEj (for j = q, p) are the added variances to
Bob’s beam and to Eve’s, in excess of the initial variance,
then these variance increases must satisfy [27]:
σ2Bqσ
2
Ep ≥
1
16
, σ2Bpσ
2
Eq ≥
1
16
. (4)
For optimal cloning devices, the effect on the q and p
quadratures should be the same; henceforth, we therefore
assume that σ2q = σ
2
p ≡ σ2 for all participants.
In addition to the increased variance, any cloning de-
vice will involve additional input ports besides the one
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FIG. 2: (Color online) A model of a Gaussian cloner [28] applied by Eve to Bob’s beam. The cloner can be realized by combining
an amplifier with a beam splitter. Besides the input from the source (ain), there are two additional inputs: one to the amplifier
(bin), the other to the first beam splitter (cin). The result is two outputs with quadratures that have means equal to that of
the input. One copy (aout) is sent on to Bob. Eve keeps the other (cout) to make measurements on.
carrying the state to be cloned. These will introduce ad-
ditional unmeasured fluctuations, converting a pure in-
put state into a mixed output state [27], consequently
leading to a loss of coherence between previously entan-
gled states. We consider eavesdropping on only one of
the two channels because, given our emphasis on eaves-
dropper detection, this is the most advantageous situa-
tion for Eve: placing cloners in both channels can only
make make her situation worse by affecting Alice’s state
as well.
A generic schematic of a Gaussian cloner is shown in
Fig. 2(a). In addition to the input beam to be cloned
(represented by annihilation operator aˆin = aˆ2), there
is an input cˆin, assumed to be in a vacuum state, onto
which the clone is to be imprinted at output. One fur-
ther input port bˆin leads to an internal amplifier. We
assume the specific model of Ref. [28], realized in terms
of two beam splitters and a nondegenerate optical para-
metric amplifier (NOPA), as in Fig. 2(b). There are
three output beams: an ancilla (bˆout) and two clones of
the input state. One clone (aˆout) is sent on to Bob, and
one (cˆout) is kept by Eve. The input-output relations for
the operators in the Heisenberg picture are [28]
aˆout = aˆin − e
−γ
√
2
(
cˆin + bˆ
†
in
)
(5)
bˆout = −
√
2 sinh γcˆ†in +
√
2γbˆin − aˆ†in (6)
cˆout = aˆin +
e+γ√
2
(
cˆin − bˆ†in
)
. (7)
Here, the asymmetry between the two clones is measured
by a parameter ξ which has value ξ = ln 22 for the sym-
metric case. Then γ = ξ − ln 22 measures the deviation
from symmetry. The optimal case of γ = 0 produces fi-
delity Fa = Fc =
2
3 for both clones. It is readily verified
that the mean values at both outputs are unchanged from
the input, 〈qˆE〉 = 〈qˆ′2〉 = 〈qˆ2〉 and 〈pˆE〉 = 〈pˆ′2〉 = 〈pˆ2〉. It
is also straightforward to show that the variances satisfy
∆q2a,out = ∆q
2
a,out +
1
4
e−2γ (8)
∆p2a,out = ∆p
2
a,out +
1
4
e−2γ (9)
for the clone sent to Bob, and
∆q2c,out = ∆q
2
c,out +
1
4
e+2γ (10)
∆p2c,out = ∆p
2
c,out +
1
4
e+2γ (11)
for the clone kept by Eve. Due to the cloning procedure,
Bob and Eve each therefore gain added variances (beyond
the original variance of the beam in transit to Bob) of
σ2B =
1
4e
−2γ and σ2E =
1
4e
2γ , respectively.
In the Schro¨dinger picture, the cloner has the effect of
altering the state: a pure input state will be converted to
a mixed output with a probability distribution of width
σ2B [27], which will inevitably damage or destroy the en-
tanglement of the cloned state with Alice’s state.
IV. ENTANGLEMENT WITNESS APPROACH.
Recall that, using the Bell–CHSH inequality, the ab-
solute value of the expectation value of the Bell–CHSH
operator B, when properly applied, provides a necessary
and sufficient indication of the presence or absence of en-
tanglement for pure states. In that sense, the absolute
value |B| is the longest-used strong entanglement witness.
Here, in place of |B| falling below the critical Bell inequal-
ity value 2 as the indicator of loss of entanglement, we
use the loss of the negative-valuedness of an entangle-
ment witness S that is observable with a much simpler
apparatus. To our knowledge, this is the first time the
use of an entanglement indicator other than the expecta-
tion value of a Bell-type operator has been proposed for
use in entangled coherent state QKD.
An entanglement witness is a quantity which is neg-
ative whenever a system is entangled; in general, when
it is non-negative this is no longer the case and nothing
can be said about the entanglement or separability of the
system. Entanglement witnesses can often be based on
the positive partial trace (PPT) criterion of [29, 30]. For
continuous variables, the most common such witnesses
are formed from the second-order correlation functions
5(i.e. on covariance matrices). These are extremely use-
ful because Gaussian states are completely determined
by their means and covariance matrices; as a result, such
witnesses often completely characterize the entanglement
properties of Gaussian states. In particular, some entan-
glement witnesses, such as the function Ws mentioned in
section V, are both necessary and sufficient conditions
for entanglement when applied to Gaussian states, be-
ing positive if and only if the state is separable. Such
witnesses are referred to as strong witnesses.
However, covariance-based entanglement measures,
which do not take into account correlations among higher
moments, may not be fine enough a measure to de-
tect entanglement in non-Gaussian systems, so a num-
ber of higher-order entanglement measures have been dis-
cussed in the literature [9, 31–34]. These involve expec-
tation values of operators formed from products of more
than two creation or annihilation operators (or, equiv-
alently, products of more than two quadrature opera-
tors). Here we will consider one such measure, denoted
S, and show that it can detect the presence of eavesdrop-
ping: when an eavesdropper acts, it will switch sign from
negative to positive values. Because S is only a neces-
sary and not a sufficient measure for entanglement - in
other words, it is not a strong witness - it cannot be said
with certainty that entanglement is lost when the sign
changes. Whether or not entanglement persists after the
sign change is ultimately beside the point for our cur-
rent purpose: the sign change in any case indicates the
presence of an eavesdropper, which is our goal. In addi-
tion, so long as the sign does remain negative we can say
with certainty that the system remains entangled, and
that under an appropriate protocol it therefore remains
secure. If S < 0 then entanglement persists and com-
munication can continue; but if S ≥ 0, communication
should be shut down in order to assure security, even
though there is a chance that entanglement still persists.
The entanglement witness to be used here was intro-
duced in [9] and is defined by the determinant
S =
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1 〈aˆ†2〉 〈aˆ1aˆ†2〉
〈aˆ2〉 〈aˆ†2aˆ2〉 〈aˆ1aˆ†2aˆ2〉
〈aˆ†1aˆ2〉 〈aˆ†1aˆ†2aˆ2〉 〈aˆ†1aˆ1aˆ†2aˆ2〉.
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (12)
Here aˆ1 is the annihilation operator at Alice’s location
and aˆ2 is the corresponding operator for Bob’s. This
witness is valid for any state, Gaussian or otherwise, and
when it is negative the state is guaranteed to be en-
tangled. Because S involves third-order correlations in
addition to second and fourth order, it is more difficult
to measure experimentally, although such measurements
have been done [35]. The only change of the setup from
Fig. 1(a) is that the homodyne detectors would be re-
placed by a more complex detection unit.
Given the explicit form of the entangled bipartite co-
herent state |ψ〉 given in Eq. (2), S can be readily calcu-
lated. We find the elements of the matrix at zero distance
are
〈aˆ†2〉 = 〈aˆ2〉 = α cosφ (13)
〈aˆ1aˆ†2〉 = 〈aˆ†1aˆ2〉
= α2|N |2
(
cos 2φ+ e−4α
2 sin2 φ
)
(14)
〈aˆ†2aˆ2〉 = α2|N |2
(
1 + cos 2φe−4α
2 sin2 φ
)
(15)
〈aˆ1aˆ†2aˆ2〉 = α3 cosφ (16)
〈aˆ†1aˆ1aˆ†2aˆ2〉 = α4. (17)
It is straightforward to verify that S → 0 as α → 0
or α → ∞, while S < 0 at all finite values of α. All
terms in the determinant are proportional to α6, with
additional amplitude dependence coming from the expo-
nential terms in Eqs. (14) and (16); the latter terms are
negligible except when α << 1. For small φ, the terms in
S nearly cancel, leaving S with a small (negative) value.
S → 0 continuously as φ → 0, i.e. as the state becomes
separable.
Distance dependance can be taken into account by re-
placing the amplitude in each arm by α → αj(dj) =
αtj(dk), where tj is a transmission function in the jth
branch, for j = 1, 2. We assume that φ << 1 and αφ >>
1 initially, but due to losses α will eventually decay to
small values, at which point the phase space regions cen-
tered at αe±iφ may begin to overlap, resulting in entan-
glement loss. For propagation losses alone, the transmis-
sion functions are of form tj(dj) = e
− 12Kjdj , with prop-
agation distance dj in each arm. When these losses are
included, expressions of the form 〈aˆl1aˆ†m1 aˆn2 aˆ†p2 〉 are multi-
plied by factors of e−
K
2 [(l+m)d1−(n+p)d2], while the expo-
nential terms in Eqs. (13)-(17) and in the normalization
constant Eq. (3) become exp
(
−4α2e−K2 (d1+d2) sin2 φ
)
.
Given this, the entanglement witness can be calculated
as a function of distance for various parameter values.
Plots of S versus distance are shown in Fig. 3 for
several parameter values. Two cases are shown: the
case of equal decay in both arms (Alice and Bob equal
distances from the source), and for decay in one arm
only (Alice acting as the source). Note that for the
asymmetric case, S has been multiplied by 100 in Fig.
3(a) in order to display it on the same scale as the
symmetric case. As expected, S is initially small and
negative. As the amplitudes decay, the exponential
terms in Eqs. (14) and (15) start to become significant
when exp
(
−4α2e−K2 (d1+d2) sin2 φ
)
becomes comparable
in size to cos 2φ. This signals the beginning of significant
overlap between the two phase space regions in Fig. 4.
At this point, there is a negative dip is S, followed by
an asymptotic decay back toward zero, due to the decay
of the overall α6(d) dependance. The latter decay re-
sults from the regions of Fig. 4 approaching the vacuum
state at the origin. Thus, the dips occur at the point
where the entanglement starts to become unusable due
to photon loss,and therefore signals the outer limits of
6the distance at which the method is useful for the given
input parameters.
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FIG. 3: (Color online) (a) Behavior of entanglement witness
S as a function of distance, assuming that the amplitudes
have decay constants K = .046 km−1. Here, α = 100 and
φ = .1. The red dashed line assumes symmetric decay. The
solid blue line assumes that the source is in Alice’s lab, so
that decay occurs only on one side; the values in this latter
case were magnified by a factor of 100 before plotting.
Note from the figure that although the large negative
dip is orders of magnitudes smaller when the decay is oc-
curring in only one arm, it occurs at roughly twice the
distance. The zero crossing of W will similarly be seen
in the next section to occur at twice the distance in the
asymmetric case. This is significant because it means
that the mechanism for eavesdropper detection will work
over roughly twice the distance in the asymmetric case.
As shown in Fig. 4, the entanglement loss is slower in
the asymmetric case because the two states may initially
move apart as one of them approaches the origin more
rapidly than the other. In any event, as will be seen in
the next section, the dips in S occur at roughly the loca-
tion where the photon number has decayed to the point
where homodyne measurements become imprecise. Thus,
predictions beyond the beginning of these dips should be
considered meaningless. Henceforth, except when stated
otherwise, the figures in the remainder of this paper will
be plotted for the symmetric case versus total Alice-Bob
distance, d = d1 + d2; plotted this way, the asymmetric
case shows only minor differences, aside from a change of
scale.
Replacing aˆ2 in Eq. (12) by the output aˆout of a cloner,
the effect of eavesdropping on S can be evaluated. Ex-
amples of the results are shown in Fig. 5. It is clear from
the plots that S < 0 in the absence of eavesdropping, but
switches to S > 0 when Eve is present.
Since S is only slightly negative at most distances, it
only requires a small disturbance to tip it to the posi-
tive side of axis. The initially large size of the positive
S values in the presence of eavesdropping may seem sur-
prising, but it can be traced to its source: the large value
of 〈aˆ†1aˆ1〉 acts as a multiplier, magnifying changes in S.
To see this, note first that if S is expanded out explic-
itly in terms of expectation values, the only terms that
change when the eavesdropper acts can be written in the
FIG. 4: (Color online) The larger distance of disentanglement
for the asymmetric case in Fig. 3 is due the fact that the two
coherent states move apart in phase space, whereas in the
symmetric case both decay toward the same vacuum state.
form (
〈aˆ†1aˆ1〉 − 〈aˆ†1〉2
)
〈aˆ†1aˆ1aˆ†2aˆ2〉. (18)
The terms in the parentheses can be written as 〈∆q21 +
∆p21+i [pˆ1, qˆ1]〉, which is nonnegative on general quantum
mechanical principles; for the specific states considered in
this paper, it can be written more concretely as α2 sin2 φ,
which is also clearly non-negative. Since this term is pos-
itive, S will increase if the fourth order term multiplying
it increases. With eavesdropping, the fourth-order term
does increase by an amount proportional to 〈aˆ†1aˆ1〉e−2γ ,
which in turn is proportional to Alice’s squared ampli-
tude, α2. At small distances, S is initially small and
negative, but the amplitude α is large, so that this term
adds a large positive value to the entanglement witness.
In more physical terms, the cloner transforms the initial
pure state en route to Bob into a mixed state, leading to
a decrease in entanglement; the effect of this loss on the
witness is large because it is multiplied by the coherent
state amplitude, which we explicitly assume to be large.
The loss of decoherence results from the fact that not
only are the phase space regions in Fig. 4 larger, their
locations fluctuate relative to each other about fixed av-
erage positions as a result of the uncontrolled relative
phase fluctuations introduced by the cloner.
V. AN EAVESDROPPING WITNESS
In analogy to an entanglement witness, we wish now to
introduce the concept of an eavesdropping witness. We
will define this to be an experimentally measurable func-
tion of the system’s state which changes value in a pre-
dictable manner whenever an eavesdropper acts on the
system. Here we will introduce such a measure that will
give results closely related to those of the entanglement
witness S introduced in section IV. So this new function
7FIG. 5: (Color online) Behavior of entanglement witness S as
a function of distance, with and without eavesdropping, for
α = 1000 and φ = .1, assuming symmetric decay. The curves
correspond to no eavesdropping (solid red), γ = 0 (dashed
green), γ = −1 (dash-dot blue), γ = −2 (dotted black).
will also witness eavesdropping but is much easier to mea-
sure. This eavesdropping witness W is constructed from
the covariance matrix of the system, and will change signs
from negative to positive at a distance that can be easily
calculated. This distance changes in a predictable man-
ner when the system is interfered with, thus signalling
the presence of an eavesdropper.
Let qˆ1, pˆ1 be orthogonal quadratures for beam A and
qˆ2, pˆ2 be corresponding quadratures for B. Form the
vector: ηˆ = (qˆ1, pˆ1, qˆ2, pˆ2) . The covariance matrix V
is defined as the 4 × 4 matrix with elements Vij =
1
2 〈{ηˆi − 〈ηi〉, ηˆj − 〈ηj〉}〉, where {.. , .. } denotes the an-
ticommutator and angular brackets denote expectation
value. V can be expressed in terms of three 2×2 matrices
as V =
(
A1 C
CT A2
)
. A1 and A2 are the self-covariance
matrices of each beam separately; C describes correla-
tions between the Ai. An eavesdropping witness derived
from the covariance matrix is then defined as
W = 1 + det V + 2 det C − det A1 − det A2. (19)
This function W is similar in form to an entanglement
witness Ws introduced in [17] and studied in detail in
[18], but due to the normalization differences mentioned
in the introduction, it is not the same function and so
here is not a true entanglement witness. W andWs are in
fact related by a rescaling of the quadratures, but for the
states considered in this paper Ws vanishes identically.
It can be shown that for Gaussian states, a system is
entangled if and only if Ws < 0. Ws, like S, is based
on the positive partial trace criterion [29, 30]; however
because Ws is quadratic in the quadrature operators, it
is unable to detect some forms of entanglement that can
be detected by the quartic operator S. The vanishing of
Ws on the states used here is due to the fact that they
are not strictly Gaussian; however we will make use in
section VII of the fact that the non-Gaussian terms are
small for large α.
Using an eavesdropping witness derived from the co-
variance matrix, as W is, has distinct advantages, since
Alice-Bob Distance (km)
FIG. 6: (Color online) Eavesdropping witness W value ver-
sus Alice-Bob distance d = d1 + d2. From left to right, the
curves have parameter values |αφ| = 10, |αφ| = 20, |αφ| = 50,
|αφ| = 100, |αφ| = 500, |αφ| = 1000, and |αφ| = 5000.
K = .046 km−1 is used for the 1550 nm telecom window.
An expanded view of the region enclosed in the dashed box
is shown in Fig. 7
V is experimentally measurable via heterodyne detection
and its expected behavior with distance is straightfor-
ward to calculate. So deviations from its expected dis-
tance dependence are easily detected. The eavesdrop-
per’s actions affect the various covariances and moments
of the states; the idea is to find a function which distills
these effects into a single number in a useful way. Clearly,
many such functions are possible, but we examine here
just one example.
Assuming loss rates K1 and K2 in each arm, then the
covariance matrix is
V =
(
A′1 C
′
C′ T A′2
)
=


a′1 0 b
′ 0
0 a′1 0 c
′
b′ 0 a′2 0
0 c′ 0 a′2

 , (20)
where
a′j(dj) =
|α|2
2
(|N |2f(θ, φ, dj)− 1) e−Kjdj + 1
4
(21)
b′(d1, d2) =
|α|2
2
(|N |2g(θ, φ, d1, d2) (22)
− cos 2φ) e− 12 (K1d1+K2d2)
c′(d1, d2) =
|α|2
2
(|N |2g(θ, φ, d1, d2) (23)
−1) e− 12 (K1d1+K2d2)
with j = 1, 2. Here we have also defined
f(θ, φ, dj) =
[
1 + cos 2φ cos θe−4|α|
2 sin2 φ e−Kdj
]
(24)
g(θ, φ, d1, d2) = [cos 2φ (25)
+ cos θe−4|α|
2 sin2 φ e−(K1d1+K2d2)/2
]
.
The values of a′, b′, c′ at zero distance will be denoted
by a, b, c. Distance dependance also arises through
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FIG. 7: (Color online) Expanded view of the region enclosed
in the dashed box in Fig. 6. The curves have parameter values
|αφ| = 500(dashed brown), |αφ| = 1000 (dotted violet), and
|αφ| = 5000 (solid red). K = .046 km−1 is used for the
1550 nm telecom window.
N(d1, d2). The entanglement witness is then
W = 1 + (a′1a′2)2 + (b′c′)2 − (b′ 2 + c′ 2)a′1a′2
+2b′c′ − a′ 21 − a′ 22 . (26)
Henceforth we assume that in both channels the rate
for fiber loss is that of the 1550 nm telecom window,
K1 = K2 ≡ K = .046 km−1, corresponding to 3 dB loss
per 15 km. We also write now for the most part express
results in terms of the total Alice-to-Bob distance, d =
d1+d2. In this manner, the symmetric case (equal travel
distances in both channels, d1 = d2) and the case where
Alice generates the state in her lab (d1 = 0, with no losses
on her side) can both be expressed in a unified manner.
Plots ofW vs. distance are given in Fig. 6. W starts with
large negative values at d = 0 and its magnitude decays
rapidly with distance due to propagation losses. Close
inspection shows thatW crosses from negative to positive
values at finite distances (see the expanded version in Fig.
7).
The exponential terms in f and g are negligible except
at large distances, by which point the α2(d) terms that
multiply them in Eqs. (21)-(23) have decayed away. As
a result, these terms can be neglected for most purposes.
Dropping them, it is then seen that all of the curves in
Fig. 7 converge to a common asymptote as |α| → ∞,
located at W = (1 − a2)2 = ( 1516)2 ≈ 0.8789.
VI. CROSSING THRESHOLDS
Entanglement sudden death (ESD) is the sudden loss
of entanglement in finite time—corresponding here to fi-
nite distance—in contrast to the more common asymp-
totic loss of entanglement due to decoherence [19, 36, 37].
Although, as mentioned, the eavesdropping witnessW is
not an entanglement witness, behavior analogous to ESD
occurs here. The point at with the axis is crossed moves
FIG. 8: (Color online) The distance d0 at which axis crossing
occurs, as a function of the parameter |αφ| ≈ |α sinφ| for
K = .046 km−1. The solid blue curve is the Alice-to-Bob
distance. This the same as the source-to-Bob distance for the
case of loss in only one arm (source in Alice’s lab), and is
double the source-to-Bob distance for case of equal distances
in both branches (dashed red curve).
in the presence of eavesdropping and closely tracks fea-
tures of the true entanglement S witness discussed in Sec.
IV; as a result, the location of this crossing point can be
used as means of eavesdropper detection.
For φ = 0 the matrix elements reduce to a = 14 and
b = c = 0, so we find thatW = 1−a4−2a2 = (1−a2)2 =(
15
16
)2
> 0, at all distances. But for nonzero φ,W changes
sign when |α(d)| =
√
15
4 cscφ. Solving for distance,
we find that the sign change occurs when the distance
between Alice and Bob is
d0 =
2
K
ln
(√
8
15
α sinφ
)
. (27)
These results are plotted in Fig. 8. Although here we
restrict ourselves to small φ, it may be noted in passing
that, for fixed α, the crossing distance is largest at φ = pi2 ,
i.e. when the entangled states are |α〉 and | − α〉. As
the distance formula makes clear, crossing can always
be made to occur at any distance desired by choosing
appropriate values of φ and α.
Let us now consider the effect of eavesdropping on W .
The variances on the diagonal of A2 are increased by
1
4e
−2γ , so the crossing distance is now altered in the pres-
ence of eavesdropping to the new value
d(γ) =
2
K
ln
[√
8
15
(
1− 1
15
e−2γ
)−1
α2 sin2 φ
]
. (28)
d(γ) becomes complex for γ < γ0, where γ0 ≡ − 12 ln 15 ≈−1.3540. So for eavesdropping parameters below γ0 there
is no crossing, and W is always negative. This lack
of axis-crossing provides a clear and unambiguous sig-
nal of eavesdropping. For γ > γ0, the crossing dis-
tance becomes finite, starting at large values and decay-
ing rapidly to d0 as γ increases (Fig. 9). Since the ratio
9FIG. 9: (Color online) The solid blue line is the distance d(γ)
(in kilometers) between Alice and Bob at which W crosses
the axis, as a function of eavesdropping parameter γ. The
amplitude and phase values assumed are α = 105 and φ = .1.
The dashed red line shows the distance d0 in the absence of
eavesdropping.
FIG. 10: (Color online) The ratio of added variances for Bob
and Eve, r =
σ
2
E
σ
2
B
is plotted versus γ, for φ = .1. The curve is
independent of α.
of Eve’s added variance (beyond the vacuum value) to
Bob’s added variance, r =
σ2E
σ2B
= e4γ , increases expo-
nentially with γ, the shift in crossing point is large (or
infinite) for parameter values where Eve can measure the
quadratures with precision (large negative γ). The shift
only becomes too small to detect exactly in the region
where Eve’s variance is too large for her to extract an
accurate measurement (positive γ). This is illustrated in
Fig. 10, where r is plotted versus γ. By the time the
shift in crossing point is reduced to 1 meter in size, Eve’s
variance is 2.2 times that of Bob; by the time ∆d drops
to .5 meters, the added variance ratio grows to r = 8.6.
The average number of photons in a coherent state is
related to the amplitude by 〈n〉 = α2, so if the amplitude
is decaying as α(d) = αe−Kd/2, then the distance D1 at
which the number of photons decays to roughly one is
D1 =
2
K
lnα. (29)
More generally, the distance at which the number has
decayed to 〈n〉 = N is
DN =
2
K
ln
(
α√
N
)
. (30)
Δd
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FIG. 11: (Color online) The curves shift horizontally by ap-
proximately a constant amount ∆d(γ,Λ) in the presence of
eavesdropping. Here the solid red line is in the absence of
eavesdropping for α = 1000 and φ = .1. The dashed blue line
is in the presence of eavesdropping with γ = −1. The crossing
of the W = Λ line can be used instead of the W = 0 crossing;
this allows more photons to still be present for measurement,
increasing measurement accuracy.
Unless φ is relatively large (of order .1 or more), the
points at which the curves cross the axis tend to be in the
regions where a small number of photons remain in the
beam, making homodyne or heterodyne measurements
at those points imprecise. As a result, it is advanta-
geous instead to look at the distances at which the W
curve crosses some negative value Λ, instead of the dis-
tance where it crosses zero. Let the distance at which
W = Λ be d(γ,Λ). In the absence of an eavesdropper,
the distance would be d(∞,Λ), so that the distance that
this crossing moves in the presence of eavesdropping is
∆d(γ,Λ) = d(γ,Λ) − d(∞,Λ). It is straightforward to
show that
d(γ,Λ) =
2
K
ln
[
α2 sin2 φ
F (γ)− ΛF (γ)
]
(31)
∆d(γ,Λ) =
2
K
ln
[
15
16 − 1615Λ
F (γ)− ΛF (γ)
]
, (32)
where F (γ) ≡ 1516
(
1− 115e−2γ
)
. This shift is independent
of the initial value of α, and varies only very slowly with
Λ. The value of Λ used can be chosen as appropriate
for the given experiment to ensure that there are still
sufficient numbers of photons remaining in the beam for
accurate homodyne measurements. The size of this shift
for the particular values Λ = −1 and Λ = −10 is shown
in Fig. 12. For more negative values of Λ, the curves are
nearly indistinguishable from that of Λ = −10.
VII. INFORMATION AND SECRET KEY RATE
Although the primary goal in this paper is to use en-
tanglement in the phase in order to detect eavesdropping
on a classically modulated channel, rather than to use
the entangled phase for encryption or encoding itself, we
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γ
FIG. 12: (Color online) The change ∆d in the distance at
which the curve ofW crosses the valueW is plotted versus the
eavesdropping parameter, γ, for the values Λ = −1 (dashed
blue) and Λ = −10 (solid red). The curves are independent
of α and change very little for Λ < −10. The value φ = .1
was used for the plots.
briefly consider here other possibilities which are avail-
able in case a full quantum key distribution is desired.
In particular, the same setup can be used to gener-
ate a key from the homodyne measurements themselves.
The possible phase values measured by each participant
can be divided up into bins and the bin in which a mea-
surement falls then determines a value for the key. In
this situation, the mutual information between the par-
ticipants and the eavesdropper is relevant to determining
if it is possible to distill a secret key. With a sufficient
number of bins, the phase variable can still be treated as
approximately continuous.
The secret key rate is given by
κ = I(A : B)− I(B : E), (33)
where I(A : B) and I(B : E) are respectively the mu-
tual information between Alice and Bob and between
Bob and Eve. The mutual information is simply the
difference between the von Neumann entropies of the
individual subsystems and the total two-beam system,
Svn = −Tr [ρ ln ρ]; for example, I(A : B) = Svn(ρA) +
Svn(ρB)− Svn(ρAB). If K > 0, then it is possible to dis-
till a secret key via privacy amplification. If the differ-
ence in Eq. (33) is negative, then κ is taken to be zero.
The mutual information can be calculated numerically
from the density operator of the system. However an ap-
proximate but simpler and more transparent evaluation
can be obtained by noting that the system in question
can be treated as an approximately Gaussian system for
small φ. This can be seen, for example by calculating
the characteristic function (the Fourier transform of the
Weyl operator) or the Wigner function of the system.
FIG. 13: (Color online) Mutual information between Alice
and Bob, assuming both have same initial amplitude α. From
the top line downward, the initial amplitudes are α = 105
(red), α = 104 (violet), α = 103 (black), and α = 100 (blue).
φ = .1 for all curves.
The characteristic function for example, is of the form
γ(λ, ζ) =
1
2
e−
1
4 (|q1+iζ1|2+|q2+iζ2|2) (34)
×
∫
d2λ d2χ e−(2|α|
2+|λ|2+|χ|2)
×e i2 [(q1+iζ1)λ∗+(q2+iζ2)χ∗+(q1−iζ1)λ+(q2−iζ2)χ]
×
(
eα(λr+χr) cosφ+2α(λi−χi) sin φ
+eα(λr+χr) cosφ+2α(χi−λi) sinφ
+eα(λr+χr) cosφ+2iα(χr−λr) sinφ
+ eα(λr+χr) cosφ+2α(χr−λr) sinφ
)
Here, subscripts 1 and 2 label Alice’s and Bob’s sides,
while subscripts r and i label real and imaginary parts.
Because of the terms in the last large parentheses, γ is
a sum of four Gaussians. But when φ is small, the sine
terms in the exponentials become negligible compared to
the cosine terms, leaving all four of these terms equal.
The only case when this argument breaks down is when
the differences χi − λi or χr − λr are large; however this
part of the integration range is strongly suppressed by
the term e−(2|α|
2+|λ|2+|χ|2) in the second line. Thus, to a
high degree of accuracy, we can treat the system as Gaus-
sian. This approximation becomes better as the distance
becomes large and the amplitudes decay to small values,
which is exactly the region of greatest interest to us. We
therefore compute all information-related quantities in
the Gaussian approximation.
For a two-mode Gaussian state, the mutual informa-
tion can be obtained directly from the covariance matrix.
Define the binary entropy function h(x) = (x+ 14 ) ln(x+
1
4 )+ (x− 14 ) ln(x− 14 ) and the discriminant of the covari-
ance matrix ∆ = det(A) + det(B) + 2det(C). Then the
quantum mutual information is [38, 39]:
I(A : B) = h(
√
Det(A))+h(
√
Det(B))−h(d+)−h(d−),
(35)
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FIG. 14: (Color online) Mutual information between Alice
and Bob in the presence of eavesdropping, assuming they have
equal initial amplitudes and equal losses. Solid red curve: no
eavesdropper. Dotted black: γ = −1. Dash-dot green: γ = 0.
Dashed blue: γ = 1. The values φ = .1 and α = 1000 were
used for all curves. The same curves give the mutual informa-
tion between Bob and Eve, but with γ and −γ interchanged.
where the symplectic eigenvalues of the covariance matrix
are
d± =
√√√√∆±√∆2 −√∆2 − 4 Det(V )
2
. (36)
Plots of the mutual information between Alice and Bob
in the absence of eavesdropping in Fig. 13. In the pres-
ence of eavesdropping, examples are shown in Fig. 14.
As would be expected, the mutual information they share
decreases as γ decreases, i.e. as Bob’s variance increases
and Eve’s drops. Because of the relation between Bob’s
variance and Eve’s, it can be noted that the mutual in-
formation between Alice and Eve is given by the same
formula, but with the sign of γ reversed. This makes
calculating the secret key rate very simple, and leads to
results such as those shown in Fig. 15. The key rate re-
mains positive as long as γ > 0, which is is equivalent to
saying σ2E > σ
2
B. It should be noted that the distances at
which the information approaches zero are roughly equal
to the distances at which S became small in Sec. IV.
Since γ = 0 corresponds to σ2E =
1
4 , it follows that the
maximum allowed noise in the system for arrangement
to remain secure is σ2noise <
1
4 .
As an interesting aside, up to this point, although dif-
ferent amounts of loss were allowed in Alice’s and Bob’s
channels due to different propagation distances, it has al-
ways been assumed that the initial amplitudes were equal
for both lines. If we allow different initial amplitudes α
and β, respectively, for Alice and Bob, then the informa-
tion decreases more slowly with distance (Fig. 16). The
reason for this is similar to the explanation given earlier
(see Fig. 4) for the greater distance in the presence of
asymmetric decay.
κ
FIG. 15: (Color online) Secret key rate κ between Alice and
Bob in the presence of eavesdropping, assuming they have
equal initial amplitudes and equal losses. Solid red curve: no
eavesdropper. Dotted black: γ = 2. Dashed blue: γ = 1.
Dash-dot green: γ = 0. κ vanishes identically for all γ ≤ 0.
The values φ = .1 and α = 1000 were used for all curves.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed effects of loss and eavesdropping in
a system for distributing key bits via entangled coher-
ent states over long distances. We have demonstrated
that when combined with the entanglement-witness or
eavesdropping-witness approach, the entangled coherent
state scheme described here can in principle be used to
detect eavesdropping over distances on the order of hun-
dreds of kilometers.
Besides differing conceptually from previous ap-
proaches, our results for coherent-state QKD based on
the use of an entanglement and eavesdropping witnesses
for eavesdropper detection offers distinct advantages over
use of a Bell-type inequality for that purpose. In partic-
ular, comparing the above results with those in [6], we
see that sign changes of W always occur at larger dis-
tances than the loss of Bell non-locality resulting from
the same external interventions on the coherent states
induced. Hence, W , as well as S, is available for eaves-
dropping detection over larger distances than is the Bell-
type inequality of the proposal on [6], extending the range
of distances in which the phase-entangled coherent states
are known to be useful for QKD: simulations in [6] showed
the Bell inequality method to be useful up to distances
on the order of tens of kilometers, while the method dis-
cussed below has promise to extend the range to the order
of several hundred kilometers. Moreover, the entangle-
ment witness method requires only a single trigger pho-
ton, rather than the triple-coincidence trigger required
for testing the Bell-type inequality, a substantial practi-
cal improvement.
Of the two eavesdropping witnesses, one (W) is
straightforward to implement experimentally, while the
other (S) provides a rigorous measure of entanglement
loss in the presence of eavesdropping. The question re-
mains as to whether there is some other measure that
provides both features for this system: a true entangle-
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FIG. 16: (Color online) Mutual information between Alice
and Bob, assuming they have different initial amplitudes α
and β. From the right to left, Bob’s initial amplitudes are
β = 105 (red), β = 104 (violet), β = 103 (black), and β = 100
(blue). φ = .1 and α = 100 for all curves.
ment witness that is readily accessible experimentally. It
would be of particular interest to find a strong entangle-
ment witness that would serve this purpose. In any case,
the general idea of using an entanglement witness or some
related function as an eavesdropping witness or quantum
tripwire for eavesdroppers can certainly be exported to
communication systems beyond the specific entangled co-
herent state system considered here.
Finally, we have shown that the method is potentially
useful up to distances of hundreds of kilometers, in con-
trast to methods based on single-photon communication
which are restricted to distances of tens of kilometers at
most. It remains to be seen if the method may be com-
bined with the use of quantum repeaters [40] in order to
extend the working distance to even greater lengths.
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